There have been speculations and political apprehensions regarding the Indian Air Force strikes in Balakot, Pakistan, conducted after more than 40 CRPF jawans were killed in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir, in a gruesome terror attack claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammad. The IAF operation and the actual number of terrorists killed has been analysed at length in the media by political actors, analysts and retired servicemen. While these debates will continue for some time, there have been important developments in terms of India’s strategic and diplomatic gains that need to be understood irrespective of the actual number of JeM militants killed in the Balakot strikes.

India’s retaliation did challenge the Pakistani assumption and belief that New Delhi does not have the political will to react to Pakistan-sponsored acts of terror. Very importantly, India’s response challenged Pakistan’s narrative of nuclear threshold.

Pakistan has been very proud of its nuclear weapons programme and its dependence on the weapons has enhanced tremendously with the continuing instability within the country and rising Islamic extremism in the region. Islamabad has long tried to balance its domestic vulnerabilities with nuclear weapons, which it treats as the ultimate guarantor of its survivability and security.

For Islamabad, nuclear weapons serve three objectives: avoid conventional war against India, nurture and support non-state actors conducting terrorism against India, ultimate guarantor of its security against India and major powers (the US). Pakistan has used nuclear weapons as a shield to conduct sub-conventional war through non-state actors in Kashmir and other parts of India for more than three decades.

Pakistan has been an overt nuclear state for two decades now and its arsenal has grown considerably in size. The expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of delivery systems and adoption of “full spectrum deterrence” does indicate its rather excessive reliance on nuclear weapons for its security.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme is on course to become the third largest arsenal after the US and Russia. Islamabad’s induction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) such as Hatf-9 does signal a dangerous strategy. The existence of TNWs not only injects complexities into the existing instability in South Asia, but also, by nature, tactical nuclear weapons exacerbate enormous command and control challenges.

The weapons are vulnerable to falling in the hands of non-state actors after they are deployed, or even, while they are being transported to the battlefield. Pakistan has been proud of making ‘tiny bombs’, not realising that these weapons could actually backfire on Pakistan given the volatile nature of the state and rising extremism in society.

Pakistan started to think about nuclear weapons seriously after its defeat in the 1971 war. Nuclear weapons were perhaps seen as the sole guarantor of Pakistan’s security against the (perceived!) hegemonic India, which remains the enemy No. 1 till date.

The central assumption on which Pakistan has progressed and built up its nuclear arsenal is that a credible nuclear deterrent would compensate for the inferiority of its defence forces. Pakistan received direct support from Beijing for its nuclear programme, and in its pursuit of nuclear power status, it did have financial support from Saudi Arabia and Libya and eventually, it did share nuclear data and expertise with Iran, Libya and Iraq.

After the overt nuclearisation in 1998, Pakistan pronounced some notions regarding its nuclear thinking, which form the basis of its doctrine and strategies. The doctrine does acquire a significant reference in the context of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, given its clandestine nature and lack of empirical evidence to support critical prepositions.

In the pre-nuclear test period, Pakistan’s doctrine was that of ambiguity. Although, Pakistan even today does not have an officially announced doctrine, statements made by responsible policymakers have clearly outlined basic elements in its nuclear doctrine. There is an unofficial code adopted by the Pakistani leadership based on Indo-centricity, credible minimum deterrence (now full spectrum deterrence), strategic restraint and first use.

Very interestingly and rather ironically, the code asserts on the principles of a peaceful programme revolving more around maintaining a balance against the Indian force build-up, but it includes making a first strike in response to not only a conventional attack by India but also a posed threat from India. Pakistan has been talking rather often about TNWs, which it is confident would deter India from a conventional military response.

Pakistan has long held the belief that being the weaker state it can compensate for that weakness by taking a bold initiative, preferably with strategic surprise, to attack Indian military capability, and thus reduce the adverse margin of capabilities. This was the military strategy it practised in all the wars it waged against India, including the Kargil war in 1999 and, more important, the war through terrorism across the border for a quarter century. The specific concentration of terrorism in the border districts of Punjab west of the Beas river were clearly aimed at similar goals. Seen in context of this strategic mindset, it is not surprising it has adopted a nuclear doctrine of first use. In fact, it has often claimed that it would/could use nuclear weapons at the very beginning of the war with India if the Indian military even crossed the international border.

The nuclear weapons were meant to neutralise India’s conventional superiority and deter India from a conventional response in any form. The weapons are seen as the ultimate guarantee for Pakistan’s security. Pakistan has tried to project its nuclear assets as an instrument of blackmailing. The acquisition of nuclear capability in 1987 enhanced Pakistan’s capability to wage and escalate the covert war in Kashmir. Pakistan’s non adherence to no first use was believed to serve the objective to deter India from responding with conventional military retaliation. Policymakers in Pakistan seem to be convinced that they will be able to carry on, or rather accelerate, their activities in Kashmir under the broader threat using nuclear weapons, if required, and this would constrain India’s strategic moves. Although, this has been the Pakistani thinking for long, it has grown up tremendously with Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and announcement of the first-use policy.

In 1987, Pakistan claimed that it had the capability to build a nuclear bomb. In 1989, the then Army chief, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, announced the famous “offensive defence doctrine”. It is noteworthy that during the late 1980s, activities in the Valley witnessed a shift and terrorist acts increased significantly and were planned in a more organised manner.

The central strategic assumption of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy has been that India cannot impose a conventional war against Pakistan, leave alone achieve a decisive victory without the risk of catastrophic consequence of a nuclear attack. Pakistan believes that its possession of a nuclear arsenal, the first use policy and full spectrum deterrence would be sufficient to deter war. This logic in Pakistan has been reinforced by the common Pakistani perception that it was able to deter Indian military action on various occasions after highly provocative terrorist attacks. Former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Khalid Kidwai, laid out the nuclear red lines in 2002, highlighting military threshold, space threshold, economic strangling and domestic destabilisation. The red lines did indicate a low nuclear threshold for Pakistan.

Looking into Pakistan’s posture on nuclear weapons, some distinct contradictions have been noticed. It frequently talks about the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, with restraint and responsibility. It wants to project itself as a responsible nuclear power and  claims to have an extremely secure nuclear programme. But on the other hand, it boasts about TNWs, projecting an extremely low threshold. Obviously, last resort has not been defined by Pakistan, which adds to uncertainty and enhances deterrence. An unclear and an irrational nuclear posture projecting a low threshold has been deliberately maintained.

The assumption and conviction of Pakistan’s policymakers has been clearly challenged by the IAF strikes in Balakot. India has demonstrated its resolve to retaliate militarily, using the strategic space above terrorism and below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan’s excessive reliance on the threat of use of nuclear weapons and its assertion on first use grew with the growing asymmetries between India and Pakistan. India has been far ahead of Pakistan in terms of economic and diplomatic growth. Evidently, India has crafted a space for conventional war below the nuclear threshold. The recent Indian response has demonstrably challenged Islamabad’s narrative of the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan would continue to rely on nuclear weapons, given its internal vulnerabilities, complex power dynamics, dominant military lobby and perceived threat perceptions, but it will have to certainly rethink its nuclear posture in the wake of India’s response.

Dr Shalini Chawla is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed here are personal.